Officer Terminated after Arrest for Illegal Sale of Firearm Survives Motion to Dismiss Due Process Claim

By David Worley

Due ProcessIn Dooley v. City of Bridgeport, 34 IER Cases 1507 (S.D. Ill. 2013), the court denied motions to dismiss the due process claims of Officer Dooley, an Illinois police officer who was terminated following an arrest for illegally selling a firearm.  The charge turned out to be baseless, and Dooley challenged his termination on due process grounds and a number of state statutes.  The court found that as Dooley had a well defined property interest in his employment and no sufficient inquiry had indicated termination was actually proper, his claims could survive a motion to dismiss.

Dooley was arrested after a firearm belonging to him was found at another person’s house when authorities responded to a fire. The person turned out to be a friend of Dooley’s and they had been shooting targets earlier in the week. However, Dooley was terminated from the police force, and then brought suit challenging his termination. 

A motion to dismiss requires the plaintiff to fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted.  This is a low level of scrutiny, and is only the first hurdle the plaintiff must overcome to eventually win his case.  To prove a due process violation under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the plaintiff must allege both a deprivation of a right secured by the constitution and that the denial of that right was done by a state actor acting under color of state law, and the denial occurred without due process.

Here, plaintiff has adequately alleged that the decision maker, the Board, terminated him without notice or right to be heard in his own defense. Although plaintiff’s complaint merely recites his cause of action as loss of a property interest, he also alleges that the source of his property right for his due process claim is [an applicable state statute]. That state statute requires for-cause termination upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. Therefore, plaintiff has pled sufficient grounds for the federal cause of action based on state law.

The court then denied dismissal of an analogous state law claim on similar grounds, applying a low level of scrutiny and noting that the plaintiff alleged a cognizable property interest.

 The court then evaluated a separate  malicious prosecution claim under the same low level of scrutiny.

The common law tort of malicious prosecution in Illinois requires five elements: 1) commencement of proceedings by defendant, 2) termination of those proceedings in favor of plaintiff, 3) absence of probable cause in commencement of those proceedings, 4) malice, and 5) damages. . . Whether such claims can survive a motion for summary judgment is not before this Court at this time. Plaintiff has properly alleged [these elements] and defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.