Federal Court Rejects Disability Discrimination Claim of Correction Officer recovering from Cancer

By David Worlyey

SickIn Moore v. Maryland Dep’t of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 27 AD Cases 849 (D. Md. 2013), a Maryland Federal District Court found no claim could be made under the ADA when Arlene Moore, a corrections officer recovering from breast cancer, was terminated following an extended period of sick leave and there was no indication that she would be able to return to work.  The Officer had 8 months of leave and her doctor indicated that she either “would” or “might” be able to return after an additional 7 months of leave. The court concluded that this prolonged leave especially in the absence of a certain return date was not a reasonable accommodation.

Moore was diagnosed with breast cancer and was granted paid medical leave by the employer.  After her six months of paid leave expired, she was granted a two month extension in part because other employees donated their leave.  Moore then applied twice for FMLA leave; both times asserting that she would be returning to work after a short period of 4-6 weeks. After eight months, and after the FMLA leave had expired, Moore was cleared to return to work.  She was reinstated, but quickly went on medical leave again.  At this point, her employment was terminated.

Although the claim brought by Moore was under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, the same analysis is used for ADA claims.  Therefore, Moore must prove that she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her employment with or without reasonable accommodation. On that the court concluded:

There is no dispute that Ms. Moore was unable to perform the essential functions of her job while she was on leave to receive medical treatment. She was unable to be present at work and therefore could not perform the duties of a correctional officer.

A temporary leave of absence, if it allows the employee, upon their return, to perform the essential functions of the job, will be considered a reasonable accommodation. But the court explained this duty to provide such leave is not endless:

The duty of reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to grant a disabled employee an indefinite leave of absence to treat the disabling condition.  Additional medical leave is a reasonable accommodation only where it is finite and will be reasonably likely to enable the employee to return to work.

Moore claimed addition leave would have allowed her to return to work, yet was unable to provide the employer with a projected date of return.  Thus, there was no indication that the leave would be finite.  Moore also relied on the note from her doctor clearing Moore to work.  However, Moore conceded that she did not know when, if ever, she thought she could actually return.  Thus, there was no showing than any leave would allow Moore to return to work, and therefore extending the leave was found by the court to not be a reasonable accommodation.