Illinois Police Commander Unable to Perform the Essential Functions of Job Cannot Sue for Disability Discrimination

back injury

By Mitchell Riese and Mathias M. Deeg

In Briscoe v. Village of Vernon Hills, the U.S. district Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that that a former Police Commander that was unable to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation by Vernon Hills could not prevail on a claim of disability discrimination. The court found that the Commander’s inability to work removed him from the protection of the ADA.

John Briscoe was employed by the Village of Vernon Hills and, after injuring his knee and back, underwent surgery, post-surgical care, and additional treatment. Though both the Village and Briscoe seemed to recognize that he would not be able to return to his previous position, with or without reasonable accommodation, he did not retire. Though the details are not clear, Briscoe used his accrued vacation and sick days over a period of time and filed for worker’s compensation benefits, while the Village made numerous unanswered requests for Briscoe to undergo medical evaluations and return to work. Claiming that Briscoe was violating department policy by failing to disclose secondary employment during his injury leave, the Village took disciplinary action against him and Briscoe retired. Briscoe brought numerous claims of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Village, including claims he was “regarded as being disabled” and that the Village disciplined him due to his perceived disability.

To establish disability discrimination under the ADA, plaintiffs must show they (1) have a disability, (2) are qualified for the position at hand with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer, and (3) were discriminated against because of that disability. The key step at issue in this case was whether or not Briscoe was a qualified individual for the job at hand, and whether his being “regarded as disabled” was relevant.

The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” The Court determined that the evidence was  clear that Briscoe was unable to perform the essential functions of Police Commander even after full treatment for his injuries and possible accommodations, and that his claim of perceived disability was without merit.

Briscoe’s allegations in his complaint make it clear that even after seeking treatment for his injuries, he was no longer able to perform the essential functions for a Commander position even with a reasonable accommodation. Nor does Briscoe explain in response to the instant motion why he satisfies the qualified individual requirement… The court notes that Briscoe’s contention that Defendants regarded him as being disabled is not consistent with his own allegations that he was repeatedly asked to return to work. Briscoe was not a qualified individual protected by the ADA.

The Court dismissed the entirety of Briscoe’s claims.

            This case illustrates one of the basic principles of disability discrimination law: that the employee with a disability must be able to perform the job in question with or without accommodation, i.e., if an accommodation is necessary, the accommodation must enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. For example, a blind person does not have a right to a job as a bus driver, because there is no accommodation (at least at present) that would enable such a person to perform the job. In this case, there was no indication that the employee could perform as a Police commander.