Officer Claiming “Anti-Union Animus” Was Terminated for Misconduct, Not Union Ties, Colorado District Court Finds

By Kate Acheson

A police officer’s claim, that his discharge was due to “anti-union animus,” in violation of his freedom of association, was recently dismissed by Colorado District Court in Cillo v. City of Greenwood Village.  The Court found that the discharge was properly motivated by the officer’s misconduct, which violated a suspect’s constitutional rights and department policy, not by any anti-union animus. 

In 2007, Officer Cillo began attempting to organize his fellow police officers into a union.  When the Union organized later that year, Cillo was elected President.

In June of 2009, Cillo was involved in a situation in which officers under his supervision unlawfully entered a motel room and arrested a suspect.  After being called to a Motel 6 to investigate a potential sexual assault, Cillo assembled a team outside the suspect’s room.  The officers eventually swarmed into the room without consent, and with no factual basis to enter without consent.

After this event, Assistant Chief Harvey conducted an investigation.  During his meeting with Harvey, Cillo acknowledged that he was in command of the team.  At the conclusion of the investigation, Harvey recommended that all officers involved receive some form of discipline.  Harvey specifically recommended termination for Cillo and the other commanding officer at the scene, Wroblewski. 

Cillo filed suit, claiming the employer retaliated against him by taking an anti-union position, disparately disciplining union members, and transferring Cillo after he started union activities.  However, Cillo fails to show any facts that suggest the decision to terminate him was motivated by his association with the union. 

First, the court concluded, no facts suggest a particular anti-union animus by the employer.  While the department opposed the formation of the Union, there is no particular evidence that suggests that the Department felt the need to act against Cillo based on their disagreement.

“This Court is not prepared to say that simply because the Defendants did not share Mr. Cillo’s belief that a union was necessary for the police department, a reasonable juror could thus infer that Defendants retaliated against him for having such a belief.”

Second, the court explained, no facts were presented showing the disparate treatment for union members.  The only non-member of the union involved in the present incident was a low-ranking officer who was simply present and taking orders.  Because the officer used no violence and only took orders, lesser discipline was warranted.  In addition, the other officer in charge in the incident was also terminated, despite the investigator’s lack of knowledge about that officer’s union membership. 

Finally, the court held, no facts were presented showing prior reassignments were retaliatory.  Although Cillo argues that being transferred into less-prestigious assignments was retaliatory, this was shown to be regular practice.  The Chief had a practice of regularly transferring officers, including his Assistant Chief, into various assignments to broaden their experience and make them more suitable for promotion. 

Ultimately, the Court found no evidence that Defendants’ transfers and eventual termination of Cillo was motivated by animus against him for associating with the union. It concluded that dismissal of the complaint without a jury trial was warranted on the City’s motion for summary judgment.