In City of Inkster, 131 LA 1179 (Brodsky, 2013), Arbitrator Deborah Brodsky concluded that the Michigan City violated the CBA when it deducted the pro rata remainder of equipment allowances paid to officers in a lump sum at the start of the year. The deduction was improper because the CBA only allows for the deduction when an officer is “terminated” but in this case, the officers were laid off and subject to return.
In City of Chicago, the arbitrator found that a police officer was misled into believing her medical insurance covered her therapy. The arbitrator held that it is fundamentally unfair to put the onus on the employee to understand an incorrectly labeled doctor’s referral slip, and then reach the conclusion her treatment is not cover without a pre-certification.
In Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, the arbitrator relied on a correctional sergeant’s positive work history and the lack of conclusive evidence to determine termination was without just cause. But the arbitrator imposed a 5 day suspension concluding that the Sergeant’s use of force report, while not “intentionally dishonest,” reflected a failure of “cooperation” because it lacked “detail.”
In Dooley v. City of Bridgeport, 34 IER Cases 1507 (S.D. Ill. 2013), the court denied motions to dismiss the due process claims of Officer Dooley, an Illinois police officer who was terminated following an arrest for illegally selling a firearm. The charge turned out to be baseless, and Dooley challenged his termination on due process grounds and a number of state statutes. The court found that as Dooley had a well defined property interest in his employment and no sufficient inquiry had indicated termination was actually proper, his claims could survive a motion to dismiss.
In City of Bartlesville, the arbitrator found there was just cause to terminate an Oklahoma City police sergeant for not properly controlling officers who engaged in excessive force. The arbitrator applied the 7 tests for finding just cause and found the sergeant’s actions showed a lack of proper supervision of the officers under his watch command.
In City of Chicago, the arbitrator found that the City’s decision to demote a Chicago police officer for “problematic behavior” was arbitrary and capricious, because the decision relied solely on a complaint registered against the officer in 2007.
In Broward County Sheriff, the arbitrator found that the Sheriff’s Office did not have just cause to discharge a Florida deputy sheriff accused of domestic violence, because no reliable evidence was presented to show that the deputy head-butted his girlfriend and the little evidence that was presented had been altered at the scene.
In Frey, a NYPD sergeant sued the city claiming the NYPD's policy of mandating inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse on pain of termination constituted false imprisonment. The court held that there was no false imprisonment because threat of termination for not attending alcohol abuse treatment was a peaceful consequence for noncompliance.
In Federal Bureau of Prisons, 131 LA 536 (Betts, 2012), the arbitrator held the 14 day suspension of a corrections officer was too severe when one of the three alleged instances of misconduct was unsupported, and a fellow officer disciplined for the other two instances of misconduct only received a three day suspension. Finding that just cause requires similar misconduct to require similar discipline, the arbitrator found the penalty had to be reduced and required the officer be compensated for the days of unjust suspension.
In Dominguez v. O’Flynn, 35 IER Cases 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012), on appeal, the Supreme Court Appellate Division overturned an order of reinstatement of a sheriff’s deputy when the court found a valid last chance agreement existed. The termination was valid regardless of the fact that two of the three charges of misconduct were determined invalid because the deputy had violated the last chance agreement in a single instance of misconduct. Although the last chance agreement was entered into in lieu of a disciplinary hearing, the court found this was not coercion and did not render the agreement void.
