In, Lynch v. Ackley, the Second Circuit found that a police chief was entitled to summary judgment dismissing a police officer’s claim that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights. The Court also found that the police chief’s own retaliatory statements were an exercise of her First Amendment right to defend herself.
In, Lynch v. Ackley, the Second Circuit found that a police chief was entitled to summary judgment dismissing a police officer’s claim that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights. The Court also found that the police chief’s own retaliatory statements were an exercise of her First Amendment right to defend herself.
In McGunigle v. City of Quincy, a former Massachusetts police officer filed suit against the City of Quincy, Chief of Police, and Captain. In his suit, the officer alleged that he was wrongfully disciplined, and eventually terminated, by the department for making comments to local news organizations concerning violations of city dog ordinances infringing on his First Amendment Rights. The officer filed an additional claim of defamation against the Chief of Police for statements he made to the local newspaper. The district court found that the department’s interest in maintaining order and obedience of their officers in a public arena outweighed the officer’s interest in speech. The Court further found that the defamation claim failed because the statements did not rise to the level of malice.
In Jennings v. Wayne County, a Michigan police officer was able to establish a claim for retaliation after she complained about sexual harassment. The district court found that being frozen out of meetings, not receiving backup, and being stripped of her Blackberry could constitute an adverse action. The district court also found the officer had established a First Amendment claim because her complaints about the harassment involved a matter of public concern.
In White v. City of Athens, a former Alabama police officer alleged he was retaliated against after he was fired for reporting police corruption to the local newspaper. The City argued the officer was terminated for his improper use of police databases. The US District Court for the Northern District of Alabama sided with the officer because he had shown other officers had used the police database for similar purposes and not been disciplined, creating an inference of retaliation.
In Howell v. Town of Ball, a former police officer in Louisiana, alleged he was fired for cooperating with an FBI investigation of public corruption. The Fifth Circuit overturned the district court in finding that the officer was entitled to First Amendment protection for his cooperation.
In Yahnke v. Kane County, an Illinois deputy sheriff was terminated after he continued to hold a second job despite being asked to discontinue the work. The deputy sheriff believed the termination was due to his potential run for Sheriff and his political affiliation. The Seventh Circuit agreed, finding the deputy sheriff was entitled to a trial.
In Rossiter v. Ramsey, a Philadelphia police officer was terminated for alleged overtime abuses and then subsequently reinstated following an arbitration hearing. After his reinstatement, the officer brought charges that he had been retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right to associate by his police commissioner. The commissioner argued qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment.
In Graber v. Clarke, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a deputy sheriff sergeant, who was also the Union Vice President, failed to prove a First Amendment employment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the County of Milwaukee and its Sheriff. The Seventh Circuit stated that even though he had presented union complaints he had failed to “establish a causal connection between his constitutionally protected speech and an adverse employment action.”
In Kafka v. Grady, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the employer’s summary judgment motion against a former police officer and union president’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that the timing of the officer’s union speech and his alleged deprivations were too attenuated to find that the union speech was a motivating factor behind any adverse employment action.
