In Otto v. City of Newport, a former police officer alleged his employer discharged him because of his age, but the Eastern District of Kentucky granted the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment because there “is no evidence that the Plaintiff was qualified for the position, and there is no direct evidence of the Defendant’s discriminatory intent.”
In Nelson v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the City's motion for summary judgment and permitted the plaintiff's disability discrimination claim to go to trial. The Court reasoned that there was no clear evidence that the former officer could not perform the essential functions of the job and that the issue was proper for trial.
In Maish v. Napalitano, U. S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the Border Patrol's motion for summary judgment and permitted a Border Patrol applicant’s disability discrimination claims to go to trial. The Court concluded the applicant, Maish, had a viable claim under the federal Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination when the Border Patrol failed to hire Maish after learning of his mental illness.
In Felkins v. City of Lakewood, the U.S District Court of Colorado addressed cross motions for summary judgment and granted defendant’s motion, thereby dismissing plaintiff’s case. The Court ruled that she did not establish that she was disabled.
In DeStefano v. City of Philadelphia, the Court dismissed cross motions for summary judgment, concluding that Orlando DeStefano’s disability discrimination claims under the federal Rehabilitation Act may go to trial for a knee injury when the issue is whether patrolling is part of a lieutenant’s essential functions.
In DeLee v. City of Plymouth, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer returning from military leave was entitled to full longevity pay for his twelve years of employment under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Court noted that the City’s of Plymouth’s “longevity benefit is more appropriately characterized as a reward for lengthy service rather than as compensation for worked performed the preceding year” and therefore protected by USERRA.
In Williams v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., an Alabama District Court held that an African-American correctional officer failed to prove that he was terminated on the basis of race. Even though the officer tried to show that the white officer was treated differently, the Court was not convinced the two officers were similarly situated.
In Cox v. Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of retaliation complaints by white Deputy Sheriffs (located in the state of New York). Even though the Deputies had set forth a prima facie case of retaliation, the Sheriff’s Department was able to demonstrate non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. The Deputies were unable to rebut the Department’s non-retaliatory explanations with evidence of pretext.
In Dubiak v. S. Abington Twp., the Court denied South Abington Township’s Motion to dismiss a police officer’s complaint that he was discriminated against in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) when he was not rehired following active duty with the Marine Corps.
In Anderson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit reversed the granting of summary judgment to the San Francisco County on claims of sex discrimination, in its jail staffing policies. The court held that the County was unable to meet its burden in demonstrating that it was entitled to a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) defense for a policy that excluded male corrections deputies from supervising female inmates.
