City of Houston v. Proler, No. 14-10-00971-CV, Texas Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, May 31, 2012, dur g March 2006, a capta a fire suppression unit the Houston Fire Department (HFD) responded, along with firefighters that he supervised, to a build g fire. While at the scene of the fire, the capta failed to follow orders and was found stand g a smoke-filled room. Medics at the scene determ ed that his blood pressure was low. Subsequently, at the direction of the HFD, he sought medical treatment.
The treat g physician diagnosed him with global transient amnesia and formed the HFD of the diagnosis. A few days later, the physician released the capta to full duty. Prior to the cident that resulted the diagnosis, unnamed firefighters had told a Chief at the HFD that either the capta was afraid of firefight g or “his head goes out on him” when confronted by a firefight g situation. Subsequent to the March 2006 cident, the same Chief sent, to another chief, a letter outl g his concerns about the capta ’s behavior at the fire. As a result of the letter, the second Chief transferred the capta to an HFD tra g academy. While at the academy, he had no volvement fire suppression. Despite the capta ’s repeated requests to transfer to a fire suppression unit, the HFD kept him at the academy for approximately thirteen months. He experienced no other cidents of global transient amnesia. As the result of a hear g exam er’s decision on a grievance that the union pursued on his behalf, the HFD transferred the capta to a fire suppression unit. Regardless, as result of the transfer to the academy he sued the HFD for disability discrim ation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and an analogous Texas statute .
The Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District expla ed that under both the ADA and the Texas statute an employee has a disability if, for example, the employer regards him as be g substantially limited his ability to th k as the result of what the employer believes is a physical or mental impairment.
The Court found that substantial evidence supported a jury’s determ ation that the employer erroneously believed that the capta was disabled, i.e., was significantly restricted his ability to th k particular circumstances compared to the average person those circumstances. Further, substantial evidence supported a determ ation that the employer based, at least part, its decision to transfer the capta on that erroneous belief.
At the same time, the evidence supported a f d g that the employer transferred the capta because it had concluded he was afraid of firefight g, a circumstance that neither the ADA nor the Texas statute prohibits. Regardless, the employer violated both the ADA and the Texas statute because the decision to transfer the capta was based part on the erroneous belief that he was disabled.
