In Smith v. City of Inkster, a U.S. District Court determined that a police officer stated a plausible claim against the City of Inkster, Michigan, and its Mayor and allowed the lawsuit to proceed to trial. In his lawsuit, the Officer claimed that the City retaliated against him by denying his application for disability benefits after he filed a lawsuit. After the City moved for a judgment against the Officer’s lawsuit before trial, the Court determined that the Officer had presented direct evidence supporting his claims and that he deserved to present his case at trial.
In Vicino v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff park ranger had sufficiently alleged sexual discrimination. The Court determined that material facts for a jury existed and that summary judgment was improper.
In Melendez v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, a U.S. District Court dismissed a female police officer’s lawsuit for sex-based discrimination against the Police Department of Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. The Officer brought the lawsuit claiming that the Police Department engaged in sex-based discrimination by failing to provide suitable changing areas for female employees. In a summary judgment proceeding, the Court explained that the Officer failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any actions taken by the Police Department were motivated by sex-based discrimination. Although the Officer failed on her sex-based discrimination claim, the Court explained that the Police Department might still be liable for creating a hostile work environment towards women.
In Otto v. City of Newport, a former police officer alleged his employer discharged him because of his age, but the Eastern District of Kentucky granted the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment because there “is no evidence that the Plaintiff was qualified for the position, and there is no direct evidence of the Defendant’s discriminatory intent.”
In Nelson v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the City's motion for summary judgment and permitted the plaintiff's disability discrimination claim to go to trial. The Court reasoned that there was no clear evidence that the former officer could not perform the essential functions of the job and that the issue was proper for trial.
In Maish v. Napalitano, U. S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the Border Patrol's motion for summary judgment and permitted a Border Patrol applicant’s disability discrimination claims to go to trial. The Court concluded the applicant, Maish, had a viable claim under the federal Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination when the Border Patrol failed to hire Maish after learning of his mental illness.
In Felkins v. City of Lakewood, the U.S District Court of Colorado addressed cross motions for summary judgment and granted defendant’s motion, thereby dismissing plaintiff’s case. The Court ruled that she did not establish that she was disabled.
In DeStefano v. City of Philadelphia, the Court dismissed cross motions for summary judgment, concluding that Orlando DeStefano’s disability discrimination claims under the federal Rehabilitation Act may go to trial for a knee injury when the issue is whether patrolling is part of a lieutenant’s essential functions.
In DeLee v. City of Plymouth, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer returning from military leave was entitled to full longevity pay for his twelve years of employment under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Court noted that the City’s of Plymouth’s “longevity benefit is more appropriately characterized as a reward for lengthy service rather than as compensation for worked performed the preceding year” and therefore protected by USERRA.
In Williams v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., an Alabama District Court held that an African-American correctional officer failed to prove that he was terminated on the basis of race. Even though the officer tried to show that the white officer was treated differently, the Court was not convinced the two officers were similarly situated.
