In Stokes v. Dallas County Juvenile Dep’t, 20, WH Cases 2d 327 (5th Cir. 2013) the Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment on retaliation claims under both Title VII and the FMLA when the plaintiff could indicate no connection between her termination and the activities protected by both those statutes. Further the employer provided substantial evidence supporting the termination of the plaintiff, including numerous instances of poor performance that resulted in discipline. Although the plaintiff could make a prima facie case regarding the FMLA claim (but not the Title VII claim), the court nevertheless found summary judgement was proper when no reasonable person could find that discrimination had occurred.
In Peele v. Burch, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision granting summary judgment to the City on a detective’s First Amendment Claim against the Portage Indiana Police Department. The court held that the detective presented sufficient evidence that casts doubt on the defendants’ story and thus creates a triable claim.
In Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 35 IER Cases 432 (2013), the Ninth Court of Appeals remanded a case against the City of Sierre Madre for trial because the trial court dismissed it after it incorrectly concluded that Officer John Ellins did not qualify for first amendment protections.
In Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, Plaintiff David Bonenberger, who is white, claims that two lieutenants conspired to promote another candidate over him based on her race. On summary judgment, the court viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to Bonenberger and found that a jury could reasonably conclude two lieutenants conspired against him, and therefore concluded the case could go to trial.
The Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Montone v. City of Jersey City, reversed the District Court and allowed Officer Valerie Montone and male co-plaintiffs to bring political retaliation/first amendment claims to trial when the City froze all promotions to lieutenant despite a lieutenant shortage. The court concluded that a group of male co-plaintiffs eligible for promotion also had valid claims, even though they weren’t the direct target of the alleged misconduct.
In Salvato v. Smith, the court denied the City’s motion to dismiss a female police officer’s harassment claim. The court found the Officer successfully alleged her superior officers’ behavior was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” enough to alter the conditions of her employment. The court found the Officer’s Complaint was brimming with allegations regarding the hostile conduct she suffered, including:
In Bridgeforth v. Jewell, the court granted the United States Park Service, summary judgment because police officer Wayne Bridgeforth’s claims of retaliation were too speculative for trial. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence linking the denial of Bridgeforth’s time off award with his “protected activity” of having filed a discrimination claim.
This article demonstrates how arbitrators might view similar free speech claims differently. In Elko County, a sergeant's discussion about the sheriff's proposed staff reorganization was allowed to circumvent the chain of command since the speech was protected by the First Amendment. However, in City of Wapakoneta, a fire captain’s speech was required to go up the chain of command because the speech was not protected.
In Primas v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals overruled the lower trial court for dismissing a female, African-American Police Commander claims of sex and race discrimination, and remanded them for trial. The Court ruled that the Plaintiff’s complex theories on a manipulated retirement had sufficient merit to survive a summary judgment motion
In Minnick v. County of Currituck, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a firefighter’s First Amendment claim because there was no link between his speech and the “adverse employment action.” Although Firefighter Minnick had attempted to organize a union and had engaged in arguably protected speech by complaining about equipment and safety issues, the court found no proof that his speech was a “substantial factor” in his forced transfer and later discharge.