In Horne v. City of Detroit, 27 AD Cases 1518 (2013), the court dismissed a former Detroit police officer’s ADA claim and granted summary judgment for the City of Detroit. The court concluded that the City lawfully terminated Horne after he plead guilty to four counts stemming from him firing eight rounds from an AR-15 into the home of his wife’s lover.
In Bennett v. Dallas Independent School District, 3:11-cv-00393-D (2013), the court granted summary judgment to the Dallas Independent School District (“DISD”) and dismissed Bennett’s claims under the ADA and Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) when Bennett refused to take a psychological exam following a disability related reassignment, and then stopped showing up for work entirely without providing any notice.
In Landolfini v. City of Melburn, (2013), the court granted the defendant City summary judgment and dismissed Dominick Landolfi’s claim for discrimination under the USERRA. Landolfini alleged that the City failed to promote him because he is a reservist in the air force and that he might be called away to serve. But the court concluded that his misconduct is what led to his promotion difficulties.
The District Court in Crowell v. Denver Health, (2013) allowed a discharged Colorado paramedic dispatcher’s FMLA and ADA claims to go to trial on cross motions but dismissed her claim for retaliation when the employees’ absences place her in violation of the employer’s “Excessive Absenteeism” policy.
In Maresca v. City of New York, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the enforcement of NYFD’s zero-tolerance policy for drugs was not a pretext to discharge New York Firefighter Maresca because of his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). The 2nd Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City when Maresca tested positive for cocaine and he was fired soon after and solely because of the test results. Even though Maresca established the prima facie case because he was a sufferer of PTSD, his employer knew he had PTSD, and he was fired, the court found that the employer successfully rebutted the argument.
In Mocic v. Sumner County Emergency Medical Service, 117 FEP Cases 1005 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), a Federal District Court dismissed two of a discharged Tennessee paramedic’s claims, but allowed her claims for sexual harassment and retaliation to proceed to trial. Both of her Title VII claims fail because there wasn’t any actual harm suffered just the appearance of harm. Leading up to her discharge her employer and supervisor taunted her daily, would kick her chair, and tease her about her poorly fitting uniform as her pregnancy progressed. Ultimately she filed a complaint with the EEOC and was fired soon after; her employer asserts that she was discharged because of her inability to lift overweight patients after a shoulder injury.
In Washington v. Burley, a School District Police Chief’s due process claim survived summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the employer gave him “an opportunity to present his side of the story.” The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer never allowed the chief to submit a written response or otherwise present his response before being terminated.
In Smith v. County of Suffolk, the plaintiff Raymond Smith, a Suffolk County Police Lieutenant, failed to show a connection between his protected free speech and the adverse employment action. The court held that Smith’s First Amendment Retaliation claim failed because a jury could conclude Smith’s discipline was linked to repeated misuse of the employer’s computers and not his protected free speech.
In Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, the court reversed a judgment dismissing an officer’s Free Speech Claim. The lower court held that the officer’s Free Speech Claim failed because it was based on a self-interest motive—protection from civil and criminal liability—and not on a matter of “public concern.” However, the appeals court reserved, holding that the officer’s motive, by itself, does not conclusively determine whether a public employee's speech involves a matter of public concern and is thus protected.
In Kuhn, the plaintiff Eric Kuhn, a Deputy Sheriff, sued his employer, the county, alleging denial of procedural due process when he was terminated following a false rape allegations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court dismissing Kuhn’s claim. The court found no due process violation occurred because Kuhn had proper notice and opportunity to be heard. Kuhn was given written notice of his impending termination, Kuhn was given a sufficient explanation that he would be terminated, Kuhn had several days in which to respond, and a post-termination hearing process was available to Kuhn.
