In Hall v. Village of Flossmoor Police Department (116 FEP Cases 1209), an Illinois Federal Court threw out the lawsuit of a School Liaison officer who was fired after an admitted sexual relationship with an 18 year-old, recently graduated student. The officer ultimately admitted that it occurred and had included sex in the Department vehicle. The court determined his claim that his race played a role in the termination could not survive summary judgment when the evidence of misconduct was so apparent.
In Kosek v. Luzerne County (116 FEP Cases 1244 (M.D. Pa. 2012)), the court denied the County’s summary judgment motion concerning a discrimination lawsuit brought by a Corrections Counselor. The Officer claimed that the County had failed to promote the most qualified candidate for discriminatory reasons, and, although later corrected its action, did so only after the Correction Counselor had filed a grievance and separate lawsuit.
In Zagaja v. Village of Freeport (116 FEP Cases 1227), the plaintiff’s claims of race and gender discrimination, survived summary judgment when she pleaded sufficient facts to indicate that the Mayor’s hiring of minority and male candidates (and demotion of herself), was based on race, and any other reasons were pretextual.
In Dove v. Community Education Centers, a Pennsylvania federal district court held that a terminated corrections officer could proceed with his retaliation claim, when he was terminated after he had requested leave for his symptoms of depression. The court also upheld an interference claim against the employer for not informing him of his available FMLA leave. While the court was not deciding the merits of the claims, it was deciding, upon a summary judgment motion, whether the claims were sufficient to proceed to a trial.
The Seventh Circuit recently found, in Porter v. City of Chicago, that an offer to work a later shift so an employee could still attend her morning church service was a reasonable accommodation. Although the employee wished to have all of Sunday off and was not willing to work the later shift, the Seventh Circuit found, that did not make the employer’s offer unreasonable.
A trooper who complained numerous times of disparate treatment, filed suit after his eventual termination, claiming his employer violated Title VII by discriminating and retaliating against him due to his race. In Reaves v. Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania District Court found, “although the evidence [was] rather tenuous,” enough material dispute of fact existed for the trooper’s retaliation claim to survive summary judgment and go to the jury. The trooper’s other Title VII claim – for discrimination – lacked sufficient evidence and was rejected as a matter of law.
Officer Von Rhine, an employee of Camden, NJ County Sheriff's Department, claimed his Department violated his First Amendment rights to Free Speech by transferring him in retaliation, for complaints he made against his boss. The Federal Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed this claim in Von Rhine v. Camden County Sherriff’s Office.
In Fossesigurani v. City of Bridgeport Fire Dept., the Connecticut Federal Court dismissed an assistant city fire chief’s American with Disabilities Act claims, arising from a fire commissioner’s allegedly derogatory comment. The court found the comment alone was insufficient proof of an adverse employment action, or a hostile work environment under the ADA.
The Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found a Pennsylvania State Police pre-hire tattoo policy, was properly applied without violating an applicant’s Constitutional rights in Scavone v. Pennsylvania State Police. Although officially unpublished and not precedent setting, the case deals with an issue of emerging importance.
In Forgione v. City of New York, a New York District Court found that an officer mistakenly perceived as suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), only had sufficient proof to show “retaliation,” but not “discrimination” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), where the Department had sent the officer for a fitness for duty evaluation. The Court concluded that evidence existed of a retaliatory intent in the compelled examination, but that a psychological examination did not constitute an “adverse action” under the ADA.
